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NOTES

IF ALL POLITICIANS ARE CORRUPT, BUT ALL
DEFENDANTS ARE PRESUMED INNOCENT,
THEN WHAT?
A CASE FOR CHANGE IN HONEST
SERVICES FRAUD PROSECUTIONS
Joseph E. Huigens*
Who steals my purse steals trash; 't is something, nothing;

'T was mine, 't is his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.'
PROLOGUE

On December 8, 2009, the Supreme Court heard arguments in
United States v. Black2 and United States v. Weyhrauch.3 The Court has
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.S., Electrical
Engineering, Purdue University, 2004. This Note is dedicated to E.P.H. and M.KH.
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 3, sc. 3. Shakespeare's father, an alderman, was removed from office by an act that was most likely
persecution by "tyrannical justices of the period." T. CARTER, SHAKESPEARE: PURITAN
AND REcusAwr 145 (1897).
2 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2379 (U.S. May 18, 2009)
(No. 08-876); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Black, No. 08-876 (U.S. Jan.
9, 2009) ("Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1346 applies to the conduct of a private individual
whose alleged 'scheme to defraud' did not contemplate economic or other property
harm to the private party to whom honest services were owed.").
3 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (U.S.June 29, 2009)
(No. 08-1196); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Weyhrauch, No. 08-1196
(U.S. Mar. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Weyhrach Cert. Petition] ("Whether 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 ... mandates the creation . .. of a federal common law defining the disclosure
obligations of state government officials.").
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also granted certiorari in United States v. Skilling,4 which it will hear
this Term. Each case requires the Court to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1346,
an arrow in the Department ofJustice's quiver for prosecuting corrupt
politicians and businessmen.5 Considering the issues presented, it
seems that the Court intends to throw light on a subject it admonished Congress to "speak more clearly" about nearly twenty-two years
ago in McNally v. United States,6 in which the Court refused to extend
federal mail fraud7 to schemes to deprive the public of its right to
honest and fair government.8 Congress subsequently amended the
statute in 1988 to include frauds that "deprive another of the intangible right of honest services," 9 thereby reinstating any "honest services"
jurisprudence preceding McNally.10 Ever since, the question of what
4 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 393 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009)
(No. 08-1394); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Skilling, No. 08-1394 (U.S.
May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Skilling Cert. Petition] ("Whether the federal 'honest services' fraud statute, [§ 1346,] . .. is unconstitutionally vague.").
5 See supra notes 2-4. These cases give the Court an opportunity to consider
limits on § 1346, e.g., the requirement of a state law violation and private gain. See
infra Part III.B.
6 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102
Stat. 4181 (1988). See id. ("[W]e read [mail fraud] as limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly
than it has.").
7 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). The mail fraud statute reads, in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ... for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according
to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both ....
Id.
Because "honest services" applies equally to mail and wire fraud, references to
"mail fraud" herein include wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346. Except for
the jurisdictional element of each offense, mail and wire fraud are equivalent. See
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) ("The mail and wire fraud
statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same
analysis to both sets of offenses here.").
8 McNally, 483 U.S. at 361; see infra Part I.C.
9 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4508, 4181
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)); see infra Part I.D.
10 See infra Part I.D.
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constitutes "honest services" has festered in the courts of appeals,
which have adopted a variety of principles to limit the statute's reach,
albeit not uniformly." The resulting circuit split and post-McNally
caselaw evinces concerns regarding vagueness, federalism, and how
best to preserve the force of § 1346.12 And so, regardless of how the
Court decides these issues, this much is certain: a unifying definition
for the "outer boundaries"1 3 of honest services fraud, in light of
§ 1346's enactment, is long overdue.
INTRODUCTION

Are all politicians crooked? Are all captains of industry thieves?
In the United States, where scandals in Washington, D.C. and on Wall
Street make headlines1 4 and movie plots, 15 can anyone be blamed for
answering those questions affirmatively? Between print, television,
'radio, film, and Internet, Americans are regularly reminded that even
white-collared professionals often have evil-meaning minds and evildoing hands. Indeed, many Americans assume that politicians and
businessmen are corrupt-they are presumed guilty.1 6 Certainly, an
See infra Part II.C; see also Adam Liptak, justices Will Hear Skilling Case, N.Y.
Oct. 14, 2009, at BI (noting the circuit split over principles used to cabin
§ 1346); Adam Liptak, Elusive Line Between 'Obnoxious'Dishonestyand the CriminalKind,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, at A14 [hereinafter Liptak, Obnoxious Dishonesty] (same).
12 See infra Part II.C. According to Adam Liptak, "[i]f you can make sense of
[the] phrase, ['to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services,'] you
have achieved something that has so far eluded the nation's appeals courts." Liptak,
Obnoxious Dishonesty, supra note 11.
13 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).
14 See, e.g., Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, Blagojevich Indictment Lays Out Broad
'Enterprise'of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, at Al; Maureen Dowd, President
Rebuts New Accusations over Whitewater, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1994, at Al; Diana B. Henriques, Suit in Madoff Case Says a Manager Was Favored,N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at Bl;
Jim Rutenberg, Acorn's Woes Strain Its Ties To Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, at
Al.
15 See, e.g., ALL THE KING'S MEN (Columbia Pictures 2006); CITIZEN KANE (Mercury Productions 1941); FROST/NIXON (Universal Pictures 2008); WALL STREET
(Twentieth Century-Fox 1987).
16 According to Professor Michael Johnston, who has written extensively on political corruption, "[m]any Americans believe corruption runs rampant in political life."
Michael Johnston, The Elite Culture of Corruption in American Politics, in ARGENT, POLITIQUE ET CORRUPTION 49, 49 (Anne Deysine & Donna Kesselman eds., 1999). But
disenchantment with politicians and a lack of public trust are not new phenomena
attributable to modem, readily accessible media-they predate the Internet by
decades.
In 1944, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) reported that seven out
of ten American adults "would [not] like to see their sons embark upon a political
career." NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF DENVER, REPORT No. 20, THE PUBLIC
11
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LOOKS AT POLITICS AND POLITICIANS 3 (1944) (reporting that sixty-nine percent of

persons answered "no" when asked: "Ifyou had a son just getting out of school, would
you like to see him go into politics as a life work?"). Moreover, nearly five out of ten
American adults believed that "it is almost impossible for a man to stay honest if he
goes into politics." Id. at 11.
The NORC Report also included a selection of respondents' quotes, which are
illustrative of the sentiments influencing their answers. It seems evident that those
Americans viewed politics with a suspicious eye. See, e.g., id. at 5 (quoting survey
respondents as saying that "[t] here is so much graft in politics and it makes a dishonest man out of an honest one" and that it is "[s]ort of an American prejudice that
political life is tainted" (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). Those
who believed that politicians cannot remain honest emphasized the allure of "graft,
bribery, and easy money," and some simply spoke in terms of crookedness. See id. at
12 (quoting survey respondents as saying that "every man in politics has his price,"
"[p]eople value money and position more than honesty," and "[p]oliticians are all
crooked" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Watergate had a crystallizing effect on public opinion about government corruption. See Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Corruptionin Government, 37 PUB. OPINION Q. 628,
630-44 (1973). As opinion soured in the scandal's wake, Erskine analyzed a wealth of
poll data pertaining to government corruption. Id. That data included findings from
Gallup Poll, Roper Organization, Harris and Associates, and NORC, id. at 630; represented a cross-section of Americans, id.; and spanned six presidential administrations
from Roosevelt to Nixon, id. at 628. Whereas the proportion of "people [who] would
advise youngsters to enter politics as a career" peaked at thirty-six percent in 1965, by
June 1973 that number dropped to only twenty-three percent. Id. "Until Watergate,
corruption was never mentioned [as a pressing national issue] by more than three
percent[,]" but in May 1973, it was sixteen percent. Id. An April 1973 Harris poll
asked: "How serious a problem do you think corruption is on the federal/state/local
level ... ?" Id. at 640. The results were demonstrative:
TABLE

1.

FEDERAL

STATE

LOCAL

52%

37%

31%

SOMEWHAT SERIOUS

29

36

29

NOT REALLY SERIOUS

11

18

32

NOTSURE

8

9

8

VERY SERIOUS

Id. According to another Harris poll, by late 1973, sixty-three percent of the public
agreed "most politicians are in politics to make money for themselves." Id. at 628.
The belief that politicians use their position for private gain figured in many Americans' assessments of public integrity.
Given the multitude of scandals since Watergate-including Whitewater, Enron,
Bernie Madoff, Rod Blagojevich, and ACORN, to name a few-and the advent of
Internet and the 24-hour news network, it is illogical to think that Americans' conceptions of political integrity have improved. For example, a 2003 study suggests Americans generally distrust civil servants. See Christopher J. Anderson & Yuliya V.
Tverdova, Corruption, PoliticalAllegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 91, 96 fig.1 (2003); id. at 105 (asking respondents
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unsettling number of politicians misuse their offices-be it for money
or interns-and lately Wall Street seems chock-full of swindlers looking to fleece unsuspecting investors. Nevertheless, honest politicians
and fair-dealing businessmen do exist.' 7
Regardless of how their cases are decided, Bruce Weyhrauch,
Conrad Black, and Jeffrey Skilling fit the bill of high-profile citizens
who are widely regarded as corrupt.' 8 Weyhrauch was a lawyer and
member of the Alaska House of Representatives,' 9 Black was CEO of
Hollinger International,2 0 and Skilling was CEO of Enron Corporation.2 1 Each man was indicted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1346 for honest services mail fraud. 22 Another such individual is former Alabama
governor, Don Siegelman, who was also indicted (and convicted)
under § 1346.23 Each man was charged with the same federal crime
in a different circuit, and now seeks Supreme Court review of his case
to decide whether honest services fraud may be fairly enforced against
him.24
What constitutes a "scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services"?25 The answer varies depending
on the federal circuit in which a defendant is charged, and then it
how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "Most civil servants can be
trusted to do what is best for the country"); see also Wendy M. Rahn & Thomas J.
Rudolph, A Tale of Political Trust in American Cities, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 530, 540-43
(2005) (analyzing trust in local government with data from fifty-five U.S. cities). A
2006 news agency poll reported that fifty-eight percent of Americans believed corruption was "widespread" in Washington, D.C. SeeJon Cohen & Gary Langer, Majorities
See Widespread Corruption, Want Tougher Lobbying Restrictions, ABC NEWs, Jan. 9, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/1003a2LobbyingandCorruption.pdf.
17 For purposes of this Note, we may assume there are honest politicians and
businessmen for whom it would be salutary to adopt limitations on honest services
fraud prosecutions.
18 See supra note 16.
19 See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008).
20 See United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2008).
21 See United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2009).
22 Skilling, 554 F.3d at 542; Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1243; Black, 530 F.3d at 598.
Black and Skilling were found guilty and their convictions upheld on appeal. Skilling,
554 F.3d at 542, 546; Black, 530 F.3d at 598, 606. Weyhrauch's appeal has not been
decided due to interlocutory appeal by the government, Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1239,
and the grant of his cert petition.
23 See United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009).
24 See supra notes 2-4. Siegelman has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, but
the Court has yet to issue a decision. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Siegelman, No.
09-182 (U.S. Aug. 10, 2009). Because Siegelman's case implicates protected speech
(campaign contributions), the Court should grant cert and review § 1346 under a
facial vagueness analysis. See infra Part II.A.
25 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
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may be based on state law or subject to interpretation by a federal
court. 2 6 At its core, the problem is that a comprehensive definition
for "honest services" cannot be gleaned from the language of § 1346,
or from case law, or from legislative history.27 Each circuit has had to
establish a judicial construction of honest services,28 and the resultant
split has been criticized as subjecting defendants to ad hoc standards
of culpability by federal prosecutors and judges.2 9
A politician whose conduct is legal (though not commendable)
in one circuit may amount to honest services fraud in another.
Weyhrauch, for example, was indicted under § 1346 because he
"failed to disclose that he was soliciting work from a company with
business before the Legislature," an undisclosed conflict-of-interest
that "did not violate a state criminal law."3 0 In the Ninth Circuit,
where Weyhrauch was charged, culpability pursuant to § 1346 is independent of state law, and he may therefore be found guilty.3 1 But if
Weyhrauch served in the Fifth Circuit, all other things being equal, his
actions could not sustain an honest services fraud charge because they
do not breach a fiduciary duty owed under state law. 32
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, most courts of appeals hold that honest
services are determined by a uniform federal standard based on Congress's interest in ensuring unbiased decisionmaking at the subnational levels of government.3 3 That interpretation has been criticized
as violating federalism, because it affords federal prosecutors latitude
to police state and local officials under a vaguely defined, open-ended
criminal standard. 34 It has been said that such power "opens the door
for abuse through selective prosecution" by prosecutors with "career26 The Third and Fifth Circuits define "honest services" according to state law,
whereas circuits like the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh have held that "honest services"
are subject to a federal common-law standard. See infra Part II.C.
27 See infra Part I.
28 See infra Part II.C.
29 See Liptak, Obnoxious Dishonesty, supra note 11.
30 Id. While in office, Weyhrauch sought post-term employment at a company
affected by a pending tax bill. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th
Cir. 2008). He mailed his resume to the company, but did not disclose the conflict-ofinterest created by his solicitation. Id. The prosecution's theory was that Weyhrauch
then took a position on the bill that was favorable to the company in exchange for
future employment. Id. He was charged with devising "a scheme and artifice to
defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his] honest services
... performed free from deceit, self-dealing, bias, and concealment." Id. (alterations
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 See Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1246; infra Part II.C.
32 See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 735 (5th Cir. 1997); infra Part II.C.
33 See infra Part II.C.
34 See infra Part II.B.
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ist motives to stalk the big kill." 6 Justice Scalia has expressed similar
concern that the statute "invites abuse by headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and corporate CEOs
who engage in any manner of unappealing or ethically questionable
conduct."3 6 Ominous power is, indeed, conferred upon prosecutors
when the foremost limiting principle of a criminal statute is their discretion. As former U.S. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson wrote:
The [federal] prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and
reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind
of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements
and veiled or unveiled intimations.
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that
he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous
power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he
should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted. ... It
is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime
becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political views, or being
personally obnoxious to .

.

. the prosecutor himself.37

This Note is not about extramarital affairs of politicians or furtive
dealings of corporate officers. Suffice it to say that dishonest behavior, whether unlawful or not, should be neither applauded nor condoned. But not all failings of character amount to federal criminal
law violations, even if the person is a politician. Politicians make easy
targets for mudslingers-particularly when the mudslinger has political aspirations of his own. In politics, where the mere suggestion of
impropriety can damage one's reputation, a prosecutor wielding the
specter of an honest services fraud charge has the power to end
careers and influence elections.3 8 On the other hand, corruption may
35 Kristen Kate Orr, Note, Fencing in the Frontier:A Look Into the Limits of Mail
Fraud, 95 Ky. L.J. 789, 795 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia,J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). For a discussion on the entanglement of politics and
prosecutorial discretion, and its attendant ramifications, see generally Sara Sun Beale,
Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 369
(2009).
37 Robert H.Jackson, The FederalProsecutor,24J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'v 18, 18-19
(1940).
38 Cf Liptak, Obnoxious Dishonesty, supra note 11 ("[Section 13461 allows federal
prosecutors vast discretion to go after people they don't like or people they disagree
with politically." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Letter from Rep. John Conyers,
Jr., Chair of the House Committee on the Judiciary, to Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen-
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be so entrenched at the state or local level that the responsible investigative agencies and prosecutors, averse to upsetting the established
order, are effectively deterred from building cases and filing indictments. 39 Indeed, that possibility influenced Congress's decision to
enact § 1346,40 and remains a strong argument for sustaining honest
services fraud as a federal prosecutorial tool. But given the circuit
split on § 1346,41 whereby state politicians may face federal criminal
charges for conduct that does not amount even to a state law violation
or that confers nothing more than de minimis private gain, some measure of restraint is warranted.
Accordingly, this Note advocates substantive legal limits on honest services fraud; namely, required violation of a state criminal law
and existence of a material private gain. In view of the widespread
belief that politicians and businessmen are corrupt, this Note also recommends evidentiary safeguards against prejudicial juries and judges.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I presents a history of mail
fraud and the honest services doctrine, including § 1346's seldom
acknowledged legislative history. Part II surveys the federal circuits'
interpretations of § 1346 and criticisms fueling that split. Part III
makes a case for adopting unifying limitations on honest services
fraud prosecutions, including substantive legal requirements and evidentiary safeguards. While I recognize that private § 1346 cases implicate more concerns than addressed by this Note, I contend that the
limitations espoused herein constitute the base of a restraining touchstone equally befitting of public and private honest services fraud
eral of the United States (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://www.donsiegelman.org/
files/LetterJohnConyers-to_AGHolder.pdf (expressing concern that Siegelman's
prosecution was "politically-influenced," and that "'people who have worked in the
Department of Justice ... see a disturbing trend ... that involves partisan politics'"
(quoting Allegations of Selective Prosecution: The Erosion of Public Confidence in OurFederal
justice System: Joint HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
and the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, 110th Cong. 273 (2007) (testimony of
G. Douglas Jones, Attorney, Whatley, Drake and Kallas))).
39 See, e.g., 134 CONG. REc. 15,046 (1988) (statement of Sen. McConnell) ("State
or local law enforcement officials themselves may . . . be so corrupted as to undermine their effectiveness.").
For an appraisal of the state inadequacy justification for federal prosecution of
subnational corruption, see Michael K. Avery, Note, Whose Rights? Why States Should
Set the Parametersfor FederalHonest Services Mail and Wire FraudProsecutions, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 1431, 1447-54 (2008). The nature of political corruption, and its tendency to
involve law enforcement, presents a barrier to prosecution at the state and local levels.
See id. at 1450-51.
40 See 133 CONG. REc. 32,959-61 (1987) (statement of Rep. Conyers); infra Part
I.D.
41 See infra Part II.C.
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cases. As such, this Note proceeds from the context of § 1346 cases
involving politicians only.
I.

MAIL FRAUD AND HONEST SERVICES:

A

BRIEF HISTORY

This Part is an account of milestones that eventuated in the honest services doctrine and crystallized issues upon which the federal circuits are split.4 2 This Part begins with the original mail fraud statute
and ends with Congress's enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
A.

The Mail Fraud Statute and Durland v. United States4 3

The original mail fraud statute was enacted in 1872,44 making it
"one of the oldest federal criminal statutes in continuous use."4 5
Although the legislative history is sparse,46 Congress evidently sought
to prevent the postal system from being used to facilitate "the sale of
counterfeit currency" 47 and scheming "lottery swindlers."48 The
Supreme Court has attributed Congress's reasons for the statute to
"measures [that] were needed 'to prevent the frauds which are mostly
gotten up in the large cities .

.

. by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions

generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country."' 49 Accordingly, the statute's language made it a
crime for "any person to . . . devise any scheme or artifice to
42 For additional historical accounts of the mail fraud statute, honest services and
the intangible rights doctrine, McNally, Congress's response to McNally, and case law
interpreting § 1346, see Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights
Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 158-70 (1994); Daniel C.
Cleveland, Note, Once Again, It Is Time to "Speak More Clearly" About § 1346 and the
Intangible Rights of Honest Services Doctrine in Mail and Wire Fraud,34 N. Ky. L. REV. 117,
119-39 (2007); Daniel W. Hurson, Note, Mail Fraud, The Intangible Rights Doctrine, and
the Infusion of State Law: A Bermuda Triangle of Sorts, 38 Hous. L. REV. 297, 301-10
(2001); Carrie A. Tendler, Note, An Indictment of Bright Line Tests for Honest Services
Mail Fraud, 72 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2729, 2731-40 (2004).
43 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
44 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323.
45 Orr, supra note 35, at 789; see also StacyJaye Kanter, MailFraud and the De Facto
Public Official: The Second Circuit Protects Citizen'Rights to Honest Government, 49 BROOK.
L. REv. 933, 933 (1983) (noting that mail fraud has existed for over a century).
46 See Hurson, supra note 42, at 301; Tendler, supra note 42, at 2732.
47 Moohr, supra note 42, at 158.
48 Kanter, supra note 45, at 935.
49 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth)). But see id. at 365 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Congress sought to protect the integrity of the United States mails by
not allowing them to be used as instruments of crime." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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. by means of the post-office establishment of the United

States."5 0 Thus, to commit mail fraud, a person had to have specific
intent to use the mail for executing a scheme or artifice to defraud.5 1
The federal interest was the postal system itself; the statute did not
proscribe frauds in general.52 Interpretation by the Court and
amendments by Congress, however, broadened mail fraud's reach.5 3
The Court had its first opportunity to interpret the mail fraud
statute in 1896 in Durland v. United States.54 Durland intentionally
used the postal service to mail solicitations encouraging investors to
buy bonds.5 5 There were no misrepresentations as to his company's
legitimacy, the bond maturity schedule, or the terms of bond redemption, and bonds were, in fact, issued to every purchaser.5 6 Durland,
however, never intended to make good on the payment of redeemed
bonds; he did not undertake a good-faith effort to invest monies
received and advanced false statements regarding future promises to
pay returns.5 7 He maintained that his actions were merely a breach of
contract.58
Durland was convicted of mail fraud, but appealed on valid
grounds that, at common law, false statements as to future promises
did not constitute fraud.5 9 The Court disagreed, stating that "[t]he
statute is broader than is claimed."6 0 In so doing, the Court arguably
severed the statute from its common law moorings.6 1 It went on to
50 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
51 Id, see also Moohr, supra note 42, at 158-59 (discussing original elements of
mail fraud).
52 See Moohr, supra note 42, at 159.
53 See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Durland v. United States,
161 U.S. 306 (1896); Kanter, supra note 45, at 935-37; Moohr, supra note 42, at
158-59.
54 Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1889 to add a list of specifically
named schemes, e.g., "sawdust swindle." Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat.
873, amending Act ofJune 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323. Durland was charged
under § 5480 (not § 301).
55 See Durland, 161 U.S. at 309-10.
56 Id. at 312.
57 Id. at 314.
58 Id. at 312-13.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Kanter, supra note 45, at 936 n.22; Hurson, supranote 42, at 302 n.19. But
see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24 (1999) ("Although Durland held that the
mail fraud statute reaches conduct that would not have constituted 'false pretenses' at
common law, it did not hold . . . that the statute encompasses more than common-law
fraud."). Neder's distinguishing of Durland is circular. If, in 1896, mail fraud encompassed "false pretenses" and Durland applied it beyond common law, then "mail
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explain that "beyond the letter of the statute is the evil sought to be
remedied, which is always significant in determining the meaning,"
and that, in "light of this[,] the statute must be read . . . [to]
include [ ] everything designed to defraud." 62 Durland made an
impression on lower courts, which read its recourse to the statute's
purpose, rather than common-law underpinnings, as expanding mail
fraud to include schemes to deprive another of intangible rights. 6 3
Congress subsequently modified mail fraud in 1909 to codify the
holding in Durland and tone down the nexus between the statute's
fraud and mailing elements.6 " As amended, the law proscribed "any
scheme or artifice to defraud, orfor obtaining money or property by means
of false pretenses, representations, or promises."65 Congress also modified
the jurisdictional basis of the statute to read "for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice . . . [uses the mails or causes the mails to be

used]," thereby eliminating specific intent from the mailing element.6 6 Two cases following that amendment set the stage for expansive interpretation of mail fraud by the lower courts. In United States v.
Young,67 the Court held that "it is only necessary that the scheme
should be devised . ..

and a letter be placed in the postoffice for the

purpose of executing the scheme."6 8 Young thereby ended any
debate 69 over whether the statute only applied to schemes that intentionally relied on the mails-it did not. The question then became
whether mail fraud exceeded Congress's authority to regulate the posfraud" reached more than common law fraud. If false pretenses did not constitute
mail fraud, then Durland broadened the statute. Either way, Durlandholds that mail
fraud reaches more than common law fraud. See infra note 63.
62 Durland, 161 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
63 See United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1247 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976) ("This
court, citing Durland,has stated that the definition of fraud in § 1341 is to be broadly
and liberally construed to further the purpose of the statute .

. .

. As Durlandrecog-

nized, the definition of fraud in the mail fraud statute was intended by Congress to be
broader than the definition of fraud recognized at common law." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
64 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130, amending Act of
Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873; see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 357 (1987) (discussing 1909 amendment to mail fraud statute); McNeive, 536
F.2d at 1248 (same).
65 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (emphasis added).
66 Id. (emphasis added). Under the statute's original language, a person arguably had to devise a scheme that specifically made use of the postal service an essential
element of its execution, i.e., mail fraud required specific intent for use of the mail,
not just fraud.
67 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
68 Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
69

See Kanter, supra note 45, at 936 n.23.
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tal service, since use of the mails no longer was an essential element of
the scheme or artifice. But in Badders v. United States,70 Justice Holmes
explained: "Whatever the limits to [Congress's] power, it may forbid
any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not."71 And
so, Durland, Young, and Badders expanded mail fraud beyond common law while relaxing the mail element, essentially relegating it to a
jurisdictional hook.
The mail fraud statute was further amended on several occasions
before reaching its form as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341;72 however, its
elements remain largely unchanged. Specifically, mail fraud requires
(1) a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) specific intent to defraud, and
(3) use of the mails in connection with the scheme.7 3 But although
mail fraud was predominantly used to prosecute conventional frauds,
i.e., depriving money or property, prosecutors and courts began taking an expansive view of the statute that included schemes to deprive
intangible rights.
B.

Emergence of the Intangible Rights (Honest Services)
Theory of Mail Fraud

The intangible rights theory of mail fraud holds that schemes to
defraud are not limited to those depriving another of money or property-divesting one of his intangible rights is just as contemptible as
wronging him in his property.7 4 For example, the right of citizens to
honest government is an intangible right.75 The first proposition that
70 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
71 Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
72 See Tendler, supra note 42, at 2732 n.25.
73 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); see Orr, supranote 35, at 793 & n.36; Cleveland, supra
note 42, at 119-20. Cleveland states the third element of mail fraud as "use of the
mails ... in furtherance of [the] scheme." Cleveland, supra note 42, at 119 (emphasis
added). Orr uses similar language. See Orr, supra note 35, at 793. I assert the third
element of mail fraud as "use of the mails in connection with the scheme" for two
reasons: (1) § 1341's language does not indicate a legislative preference for the "in
furtherance"construction, and (2) the holding of Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705
(1989), does not indicate a judicial preference for such a construction. See id. at
710-15; infra note 221. Indeed, the issue is unsettled, and neither Orr nor Cleveland
is incorrect, but without direction from the Court, only good sense requires use of the
mails to be in furtherance of the scheme. For a discussion of Schmuck and its implications, see Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REv. 223, 254-63
(1992).
74 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987); United States v.
McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248-50 (8th Cir. 1976) (describing intangible rights cases).
75 See McNally, 483 U.S. at 358.
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mail fraud could reach public corruption emerged in 1941 in Shushan
v. United States.7 6 Shushan involved conventional fraud, and was
decided on that basis," but the Fifth Circuit used the opportunity to
state that a scheme intended to corruptly influence government "must
in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud."78 But despite
Shushan's emphatic language, nearly thirty years passed before the
intangible rights theory of mail fraud fully bloomed in the courts of
appeals.
Beginning in the late 1960s, throughout the 1970s, and well into
the 1980s, federal prosecutors took aim at corruption using an intangible rights theory of mail fraud-namely, the public's right to honest
services of their elected officials. 79 Such cases proceeded on the basis
that public officials have a fiduciary duty to give "honest, faithful, and
disinterested service." 8 0 The courts of appeals validated that tack on
the basis of Shushans1 and by reading Congress's post-Durland addition to the mail fraud statute8 2 as independent of-not a limitation
76
77
78

117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941).
See id. at 121 (discussing evidence of defendants' scheme to deprive money).
Id. at 115. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit in Shushan stated:
A scheme to get a public contract on more favorable terms than would likely
be got otherwise by bribing a public official would not only be a plan to
commit the crime of bribery, but would also be a scheme to defraud the
public.... No trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any
scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting such an [sic] one must in the
federal law be considered a scheme to defraud.

Id.
79 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982); United States
v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd per cuiam in relevant part on reh'g en banc, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979); see also McNally, 483 U.S. at 362 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(listing cases where "state and federal officials ha[d] been convicted of defrauding
citizens of their right to ... honest services"). For additional "intangible rights" cases,
see Kanter, supranote 45, at 934 n.6; id. at 938 n.34; Hurson, supranote 42, at 304-05
nn.32-34.
80 Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1362. Mandel was charged with scheming to defraud the
citizens "of their right to the conscientious, loyal, faithful, disinterested and unbiased
services, actions and performance of [his] official duties." Id. at 1353. The indictment characterized the intangible right as the "right to have the state's business and
its affairs conducted honestly, impartially, free from bribery, corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit, official misconduct and fraud." Id.
81 See, e.g., id. at 1362; United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir. 1976).
82 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130, amending Act of
Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873; supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
As amended, the proscribed conduct appears disjunctive such that courts have interpreted the statute to confer liability on one who, having satisfied the jurisdictional
element: (1) devises a scheme or artifice to defraud, or (2) obtains (or attempts to
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on-the phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud."8 3 As such, mail
fraud came to include schemes depriving the public of its right to the
"honest services" of elected officials.
A paradigmatic case endorsing the honest services theory of mail
fraud to prosecute political corruption8 4 was United States v. Mande 85
In that case, Mandel, then governor of Maryland, was convicted of
mail fraud for allegedly taking bribes and concealing material information. 86 Mandel favored a controversial bill that would significantly
increase the number of racing days authorized for a particular racetrack.8 7 The trial evidence tended to show that he had received
numerous gifts and a concealed interest in two real estate companies
given to him by the racetrack owners.8 8 Evidence also indicated that
efforts were made by the racetrack owners to conceal the fact of their
ownership from the state racing commission.8 9 They chose an outsider to serve as company president and act as its public nominee,
including representations before the commission. 90 At the time, however, such use of a public nominee was a "common and legal practice."91 Moreover, there was no direct evidence that Mandel even
knew that his benefactors were the racetrack's true owners.92 That
"disputed issue of fact"93 formed a partial basis of the court's decision
to vacate his conviction and remand.9 4 Nevertheless, the Fourth Cirobtain) money or property by means of false pretenses, representations, or promises.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); McNally, 483 U.S. at 357-58.
83 See McNally, 483 U.S. at 357-58; see also United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148,
1152 (3d Cir. 1984) (reading "scheme or artifice to defraud" clause independent of
"money or property").
84 See, e.g., Kanter, supra note 45, at 933-34 ("As a result of [Mandels] expansive
reading, federal prosecutors have successfully relied upon the mail fraud statute to
combat political corruption."); Moohr, supra note 42, at 166 (prosecutors use the
statute extensively).
85 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam in relevant part on reh'g en banc, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979). The facts in Mandel are similar to those in United States v.
Isaacs,493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974). In Isaacs, former Illinois governor, Otto Kerner,
was convicted of mail fraud for accepting bribes to obtain racing days for two racetracks. See id. at 1131-39, 1149.
86 Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1353.
87 Id. at 1355.
88 Id. at 1356.
89 Id. at 1354.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1355.
92 Id. at 1354.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1365-66 & 1376.
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cuit sanctioned the use of "honest services" mail fraud to prosecute
corrupt politicians,9 5 and set a precedent for subsequent cases.9 6
C.

The Supreme Court Speaks: McNally v. United States

Federal prosecutions of intangible rights mail fraud cases came to
an abrupt, albeit short-lived, halt in 1987 when the Court held in
McNally v. United States that the "any scheme or artifice" language of
the mail fraud statute could not be construed apart from a "money-orproperty requirement."9 7 The decision tapped the brakes on intangible-rights mail-fraud jurisprudence'9 8 particularly as applied against
political corruption, since pecuniary loss to the public, e.g., state or
99
local coffers, does not necessarily accompany honest services frauds,
as was the case in Mandel.100
The scheme in McNally embroiled a private individual, McNally,
who was the nominal owner of an investment company (Seton), and a
public official, Gray, who had a nondisclosed ownership interest in
Seton.10 1 The government's theory was that McNally and Gray, along
with a third person, Hunt (also a public official), engaged in a self95 See id. at 1355-64 (analyzing schemes to deprive honest services of government
in context of mail fraud); id. at 1361 ("[S]chemes involving bribery and some
schemes of nondisclosure and concealment of material information come within the
purview of the mail fraud statute.").
96 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982). Margiotta
extended the honest services theory to a private individual who, by virtue of his position and influence over government affairs, acted as a de facto public official. Id. at
122. That court held that Margiotta had a duty to disclose material conflicts of interest. Id. at 127.
97 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); see id. at 360 (stating that § 1341
only protects property rights).
98 McNally overturned the series of decisions that had established an intangible
rights theory of mail fraud. See Moohr, supra note 42, at 167; Podgor, supranote 73,
at 233. The decision reset judicial interpretation of § 1341 back to the Court's purported common-law definition of fraud, which applied only to schemes involving
money or property. McNally, 483 U.S. at 358.
99 See 133 CONG. REc. 33,254 (1987) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("In many of
these cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the State or local government's treasury was adversely impacted .. . even though it is clear that the official has
abused his power and deprived the citizens of the services to which they are
entitled.").
100 A politician who accepts bribes or fails to disclose a conflict of interest may
accrue a private gain without depriving the state of a pecuniary interest. If Mandel
succeeded in obtaining racing days for the racetrack owners-i.e., if the bill passedit would have increased state tax revenue. But since his vote was the product of selfinterest, it nevertheless breached his fiduciary duty of honest services. See Mandel, 591
F.2d at 1355; supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
101 McNally, 483 U.S. at 352-55.
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dealing patronage scheme that leveraged Hunt's and Gray's authority
to secure unearned insurance commissions to Seton. 02 The men
allegedly directed one of the state's primary insurance agents-chosen to purchase its workers' compensation policies-to pay a share of
the commissions to Seton in exchange for a continued agency relationship with the state. 0 3 Since payments to Seton came from commissions that would have been paid regardless of the scheme, the state
was not deprived of any money it would not have otherwise spent. 10 4
Moreover, the scheme-including Gray's failure to disclose his interest in Seton-did not violate state or federal law.' 0 5 McNally and
Gray's convictions were based on the theory that their actions were a
scheme "to defraud the citizens of their intangible rights to honest
and impartial government."10 6 But unlike the Fourth Circuit in
Mandel or the Fifth Circuit in Shushan, the Court in McNally held that
the mail fraud statute "does not refer to the intangible right of the
citizenry to good government" 0 7 and reversed.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, was quick to point out that, given its
interest in protecting the integrity of the Postal Service,1 0 8 it is illogical
that Congress sought to criminalize petty money schemes but was
indifferent of schemes to deprive citizens of honest, unbiased government.10 9 Citing Hammerschmidt v. United States,o1 0 Durland, legal dictionaries, and a treatise,"' Stevens also raised doubt as to whether
Congress intended such a narrow meaning of "defraud" when it
enacted the statute in 1872.112 He also gainsaid the majority's federalism concerns as overblown in light of the series of appellate decisions
validating the honest services theory of mail fraud, which, Stevens
urged, provided sufficient notice to dispel any ambiguity in the statute.1 13 The McNally Court, however, had the final word on federalism
and mail fraud:
102 Id.
103 Id. at 353-55.
104 Id. at 360.
105 See Moohr, supra note 42, at 167 ("The scheme did not result in any monetary
or property loss to Kentucky, violate Kentucky law, or violate any other federal law."
(footnote omitted)).
106 McNally, 483 U.S. at 355.
107 Id.
108 See id. at 365-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 366.
110 265 U.S. 182 (1924); see McNally, 483 U.S. at 368 & n.6 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
111 McNally, 483 U.S. at 368-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 368-74.
113 See id. at 375-76.

HONEST

20101

SERVICES

MAIL FRAUD

1703

Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and
state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of
property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more
1 14
clearly than it has.

D.

Congress Responds: 18 U.S.C. § 1346 and Honest Services

Congress desired to go further, and answered the Court less than
one year after McNally by passing 18 U.S.C. § 1346,s15 which amended
the mail and wire fraud statutes to include schemes to "deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services."' 16 Although the
amendment was a last minute addition tacked onto an omnibus drug
bill,' 1 7 Congress's intent was nevertheless clear: the mail fraud statute
is not limited by a money or property requirement and pre-McNally
intangible rights jurisprudence is restored. After noting that the
McNally decision resulted in dismissal of numerous political corrup18
tion prosecutions involving bribery, money laundering, and fraud,
Representative Conyers, the amendment's chief proponent in the
House, stated:
Prior to the McNally decision, every Federal appellate court
that had considered the scope of the mail and wire fraud provisions
held that those provisions protect the right of the public to the honest services of public officials and others responsible for the conduct
of public or public affairs, the right of a member of an organization
to the honest services of the leaders of that organization, and the
right of employers to the honest service of their employees.
This amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where
that provision was before the McNally decision....
... [I]t is no longer necessary to determine whether or not the
scheme or artifice to defraud involved money or property. This
114

Id. at 360 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).

115 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508.
116 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
117 See Moohr, supra note 42, at 169; see also United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d
728, 742 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jolly & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) ("[Section] 1346 was
inserted in the Omnibus Drug Bill for the first time on the very day that the Omnibus
Drug Bill was finally passed . . . .").

118 Rep. Conyers referred to a Subcommittee on CriminalJustice hearing held on
May 12, 1988 at which John C. Keeney, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division of the DOJ testified on the impact of the McNally decision on federal prosecutions of political corruption. See Mail Fraud:Hearing on H.R. 3089 and
H.R 3050 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJusticeof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 47 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R 3089 and HR. 3050].
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the McNally

Conyers's remarks are virtuallyo2 0 the only legislative history specifically related to § 1346's enactment, but evidence of Congress's purpose to stem political corruption is hardly lacking.
The first indication of Congress's desire to combat public corruption came just over a month after McNally, when Representatives
Mfume and Synar introduced the Mail Fraud Amendment Act of
1987.121 Their proposed legislation characterized "good government," i.e., honest services, as "public business conducted honestly,
impartially, free from bribery, corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit,
official misconduct, and fraud." 122 One week later, Representative
Conyers introduced a bill 1 23 that defined "fraud" to include depriving
another of
intangible rights of any kind whatsoever in any manner or for any
purpose whatsoever; or by using material private information
wrongfully stolen, converted, or misappropriated in breach of any
statutory, common law, contractual, employment, personal, or
other fiduciary relationship. 124
Conyers also submitted a report describing the Founders' concerns
about political corruption and the importance of the Guarantee

119 134 CONG. REc. 33,296-97 (1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (internal citations omitted). Rep. Conyers provided case citations as examples of the forms of
intangible rights envisioned by Congress in the amendment. Id.
120 Senator Biden also submitted a section-by-section analysis of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 that included the honest services amendment to mail fraud. His
report confirms:
This section overturns the decision in McNally v. United States in which
the Supreme Court held that the mail and wire fraud statutes protect property but not intangible rights. Under the amendment, those statutes will
protect any person's intangible right to the honest services of another,
including the right of the public to the honest services of public officials.
The intent is to reinstate all of the pre-McNally caselaw pertaining to the
mail and wire fraud statutes without change.
134 CONG. REc. 32,708 (1988) (report of Sen. Biden).
121 H.R. 3050, 100th Cong.
122 133 CONG. REc. 21,466 (1987) (statement of Rep. Mfume).
123 Fraud Amendments Act of 1987, H.R. 3089, 100th Cong. Senator Specter
introduced companion legislation in the Senate. Fraud Amendments Act of 1987, S.
1898, 100th Cong. Both bills would have broadly defined "fraud" and "defraud" at 1
U.S.C. § 7, applying the definition throughout the entire U.S. Code. See 133 CONG.
REc. 33,254 (1987).
124 133 CONG. REc. 22,339-41 (1987) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
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Clause125 as support for his bill.' 26 Conyers, among others, regarded
the Guarantee Clause as the appropriate authority for a federal
anticorruption statute. Furthermore, congressional hearings were
held on the McNally decision, its impact on federal prosecutions of
public corruption, and the necessity of legislation like that proposed
by Mfume and Conyers.127 Anticorruption legislation was also introduced in the Senate-e.g., the Anti-Public Corruption Act of 1988128
and the Anti-Corruption Act of 1988.129
Although none of the proposed anticorruption bills ever became
law, the fact remains that Congress did enact § 1346, which reflects
concerns about corruption that were repeatedly voiced in the House
and Senate. Some commentators have suggested that Congress's failure to pass any of the proposed bills indicates an unwillingness
between the House and Senate to agree on a precise definition of
125 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legis-

lature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.").
126 See 133 CONG. REc. 32,959-61 (1987) (statement of Rep. Conyers). Based on
the content of that report, Conyers stated:
I draw from these materials the firm judgment that the Congress has, as a
matter of original intent, the power to act to protect State and local governments, not only from foreign intrigue or domestic violence, but also corruption.... [W]e not only have the power to act, we have the duty to act. The
Constitution does not say we "may." It says that we "shall" guarantee to every
State a republican form of government.
Id. at 32,961.
127 See Hearing on H.R 3089 and H.R 3050, supra note 118, at 1 (opening statement of Rep. Conyers).
128 Anti-Public Corruption Act of 1988, S. 2531, 100th Cong. The bill would have
made it:
a crime for any person to endeavor, by any scheme or artifice, corruptly to
deprive or to defraud the inhabitants of a State or political subdivision of a
State of the honest services of an official or employee of such State or political subdivision. Conduct to be proscribed by [the statute] would include
bribery and graft, and would allow for the prosecution of corrupt politicians
who did not deprive the inhabitants of anything of readily identifiable economic value, as well as nondisclosure and concealment of material
information.
134 CONG. REc. 15,046 (1988) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
129 Anti-Corruption Act of 1988, S. 2793, 100th Cong. That bill proposed a new
section to title 18 that "would punish schemes to deprive or defraud the inhabitants of
the United States or a State of the honest services of their public officials and employees, both elected and appointed." 134 CONG. REc. 24,152 (1988) (letter of Dick
Thornburgh, U.S. Attorney Gen.) (emphasis added).
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political corruption.13 0 Unfortunately, no part of this expanded legislative history helps to discern a precise meaning of "honest services,"
but it does evince Congress's intent to reinstate pre-McNally case law
and federally criminalize political corruption. Had the Omnibus
Drug Bill not been center-stage in an election year, Congress may well
have passed a comprehensively defined anticorruption statute.
II.

GENESIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:

How To LIMIT?

This Part rebuts two foremost criticisms of § 1346-namely, that
it is unconstitutionally vague and that it violates federalism-and then
surveys the treatment of those criticisms by the courts of appeals. It
shows that vagueness challenges have not persuaded courts to invalidate § 1346, and it further suggests that the proscription of federal
common-law crimes, as opposed to pure federalism, is the primary
reason courts have adopted limitations on the statute. Finally, the circuit split on the meaning (and limits) of honest services fraud is
summarized.
A.

Section 1346 and the Void-for-Vagueness Question 3 1

Whether § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague is an issue that has
been flogged by courts of appeals, 132 commentators,' 3 3 and petition130 See, e.g., United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 744 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jolly &
DeMoss, JJ., dissenting).
131 This Note does not purport to make an in-depth analysis of the void-forvagueness doctrine in general or as applied to 18 U.S.C. § 1346. How such a
challenge might play out in the Supreme Court is better left for discussion elsewhere.
For a fantastic analysis of the Court's void-for-vagueness jurisprudence, however, see
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that
§ 1346 is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716,
724-25 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1109 n.29
(10th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 142-44 (2d Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (stating that § 1346 is neither facially vague nor vague as applied in that
case); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 371 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that § 1346 is
not vague); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); see also
United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 294 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that § 1346 is
unclear, but "judicial glosses" may "clarify and focus" its language). But see Sorich v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1311 (2009) (Scalia,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("In light of the ... serious due process and federalism interests affected by the
[potential] expansion of criminal liability . .. I would grant the petition for certiorari
and squarely confront both the meaning and the constitutionality of § 1346.");
United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 534 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., dissenting)
("[T]he constitutionality of § 1346 may well be in serious doubt."); Rybicki, 354 F.3d at
157 (Jacobs,J., dissenting) ("[Section 1346] imposes insufficient constraint on prose-
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ers,13 4 alike. But although § 1346 could be vague as applied to a specific case,' 3 5 and despite much criticism of the phrase, "honest
services,"' 3 6 the courts of appeals have not yet declared the statute to
be facially vague.' 3 7 Moreover, unless an honest services fraud case
implicates a First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court likely
cannot conclude that the statute is facially vague, either.13 8
If an honest services fraud case implicates a First Amendment
guarantee, then a facial vagueness challenge to § 1346 may succeed
under the Court's heightened scrutiny.' 3 9 For example, an honest
services prosecution based on a politician's acceptance, or use, of
campaign contributions-perhaps characterizing those funds as
bribes-would embroil protected speech.1 40 In such a case, the Court
would not undertake a purely as-applied analysis of the statute; strict
cutors, gives insufficient guidance to judges, and affords insufficient notice to
defendants.").
133 See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 42, at 187-98 (contending that addition of "honest
services" to the mail fraud statute renders it facially void for vagueness).
134 See, e.g., Skilling Cert. Petition, supra note 4, at 23 ("Even [a private gain] limitation [on § 1346] may not suffice to save the statute from unconstitutional vagueness
...
."); Weyhrauch Cert. Petition, supra note 3, at 20 ("Defining State Officials' Disclosure Obligations As A Matter of Federal Common Law Would Raise Serious Constitutional Concerns About The Statute's Vagueness." (emphasis omitted)).
135 See, e.g., United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 112 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding
that § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of that case), overruled
by Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 144.
136 See, e.g., United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the "statute's plain language is inconclusive"); Urciuoli, 513 F.3d at 294
("[T]he concept of 'honest services' is vague and undefined by the statute."); United
States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 883 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing the phrase "honest
services" as "slippery"); United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 116 (3d Cir. 2003)
("[T]he plain language of § 1346 provides little guidance as to the conduct it
prohibits.").
137 Aside from the short-lived exception of Handakas, "[n]o circuit has ever held
... that section 1346 is unconstitutionally vague." Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 143.
138 None of the cases for which certiorari has been granted provide the Court an
opportunity to reach the issue of facial vagueness under a First Amendment analysis.
See supranotes 2-4. Don Siegelman's case (and petition for a writ of certiorari), however, squarely implicates protected speech-campaign contributions-that would
afford the Court grounds for such analysis. See United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d
1215 (11th Cir. 2009).
139 See Moohr, supra note 42, at 197 ("The vagueness doctrine protects individual
civil liberty by authorizing courts to give heightened scrutiny to vague statutes that
may chill First Amendment or other constitutionally protected activity.").
140 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-58 (1976) (holding that political campaign
contributions are protected speech); see, e.g., United States v. Inzunza, 580 F.3d 894,
897-98, 901 (9th Cir. 2009) (detailing facts of the case concerning honest services
and campaign contributions); Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1220-22 (same).
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scrutiny would apply and the complainant would not have to "demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications."141
Therefore, § 1346 could be held facially vague as to protected speech,
but even in such hypothetical cases the statute would not likely be
rendered unconstitutional in toto.14 2 The force of § 1346 might be
nullified insofar as it risks chilling protected speech, but the statute
would be preserved for the range of proscribed conduct that does not
implicate First Amendment protections. 14 3
Absent First Amendment issues, vagueness challenges to § 1346
cannot be sustained under the Court's existing vagueness jurisprudence. For starters, the argument that § 1346 is unconstitutionally
vague has only been successfully made in one circuit case, United States
v. Handakas,14 and that decision was overruled shortly thereafter in
United States v. Rybicki.14 5 The Second Circuit, sitting en banc,
squarely addressed § 1346 under an as-applied void-for-vagueness
analysis and ruled that the statute's language was sufficiently definite.14 6 Despite however "vague and undefined""' 7 § 1346 might be,
every court of appeals to analyze its constitutionality has chosen to
validate honest services fraud rather than refuse its application. 148
Whatever gloss each circuit has adopted to cabin the statute's reach,
they have all nonetheless preserved § 1346 as a viable prosecutorial
tool.149
Congress may have been "terse" in its twenty-eight word amendment to chapter 63 of title 18,150 but its intent was fairly clear: Congress did not want "defraud," as understood for purposes of §§ 1341
and 1343, to be limited only to schemes depriving another of money
or property.' 5 ' Section 1346 was meant to reinstate the intangible
141 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497
(1982).
142 See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985) (stating that, in
such cases, "the normal rule [of] partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the
required course").
143 See id. at 504.
144 286 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002).
145 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
146 See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 129-44. The Second Circuit also stated, in dicta, that "a
conclusion of facial invalidity would be inconsistent with [its] analysis." Id. at 144.
147 United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 294 (1st Cir. 2008).
148 See supra notes 132, 135.
149 See infra Part II.C.
150 Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia,J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
151 See supra Part I.D.
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rights theory of mail fraud.152 Ergo, the phrase "honest services"
derives contextual meaning from pre-McNally case law 15 -at least sufficient meaning to put it on par with phrases like "moral turpitude"1 5 4
and "political purpose."15 5 And when addressing a vagueness challenge, the Court interprets a statute's language in light of "narrowing
context[ ] or settled legal meanings."' 5 6 Arguably then, it is within
the Court's province to interpret and refine-giving consideration to
the federal-state balance,157 pre-McNally case law, and Congress's mandate that intangible rights can be the object of fraud' 5 8-the proper
scope of "honest services" as that phrase applies to §§ 1341 and

1343.159
152 See supra Part I.D.
153 See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 138-42 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
154 Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding "crime involving moral
turpitude" language of deportation statute sufficiently definite). Remarkably, the
Court in DeGeorge stated, "In deciding the case ... we look to the manner in which the
term 'moral turpitude' has been applied by judicial decision." Id. at 227. Moreover,
the Court said that "[w]hatever else the phrase . . . may mean in peripheral cases, the
decided cases make it plain" that, as applied in that case, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 232. The Court relied, in part, on the fact that "[w]ithout
exception, federal and state courts" regarded fraud-the crime at issue in the caseas involving moral turpitude. Id. at 227. It would seem to follow that, in analyzing
"honest services," the Court should likewise respect treatment of "honest services" by
the appellate courts, which have, also without exception, held that § 1346 is not
unconstitutionally vague. See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 143.
155 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398 (1930) (holding that "contribution for any political purpose whatever" language of federal corruption statute was
sufficiently definite). Of note in that case are Justice Holmes's remarks reiterating
the holding in Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), that Congress may "punish
a use of the mails for a fraudulent purpose [despite] its inability to punish the
intended fraud." Wunbach, 280 U.S. at 398; accord Badders, 240 U.S. at 393. Also of
note is Justice Holmes's rejoinder to the claim that "political purpose" is unconstitutionally vague. He said:
Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on
opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one
can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he
does so, it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk.
Id. at 399.
156 United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1846 (2008); see also Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983) ("'In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a
federal court must .. . consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.'" (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982))).
157 See infra Part II.B.
158 See supra Part I.D.
159 See Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1847 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("'[E]very reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.'"
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Generally, "the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."o6 0 As such, a criminal statute must provide fair notice to
defendants and a cognizable standard by which police and prosecutors can determine liability.' 6 ' Given that § 1346 incorporates at least
some subset of conduct prohibited under pre-McNally case law, e.g.,
federal and state laws proscribing bribery or concealment of material
information,1 6 2 it arguably provides a minimum of fair notice and
standards of enforcement.1 6 3 After all, an alleged breach of honest
services must still accompany the other elements of mail fraud, i.e.,
specific intent and use of the mail.164 Furthermore, every honest services fraud case in the past twenty-two years offers warning of the
scope of conduct thought to fall within the ambit of § 1346.165 The
statute cannot, therefore, be said to be "impermissibly vague in all of
(quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895))); United States v. Urciuoli,
513 F.3d 290, 294 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Although one might prefer a more clearly drafted
statute, the Supreme Court has regularly used judicial glosses to clarify and focus
language in criminal statutes of even greater complexity and breadth [than
§ 1346].").
160 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; see also Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1835 (stating that a
criminal statute must provide "fair notice" and not "encourage[ ] seriously discriminatory enforcement"). But see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("The root
of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to
convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal
statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and
sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are
prohibited.").
161 See Moohr, supra note 42, at 190 (discussing two-pronged vagueness test).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1979)
(holding that bribery and concealment of material information breach a public official's duty to render honest services).
163 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997) ("[T]he touchstone [of
sufficiently definite statutory language] is whether the statute, either standing alone
or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal." (emphasis added)); United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 732
(5th Cir. 1997) ("Constructions of a statute announced by the Supreme Court or
lower courts can give citizens fair warning, even if the cases are not 'fundamentally
similar.'" (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 268)); cf McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 375 (1987) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("[T]he series of Court of Appeals' opinions
applying [§ 1341] to schemes to defraud a State and its citizens of their intangible
right to honest and faithful government ... removed any relevant ambiguity in this
statute.").
164 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2006); supra Part I.A.
165 See supra note 163.
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its applications."16 6 It follows that vagueness challenges to § 1346,
which do not implicate First Amendment issues, will inevitably be analyzed in light of the specific facts of the case, i.e., applied to the complainant's conduct.
Although one can imagine a set of facts for which § 1346 may be
vague as applied, most challengers will fight an uphill battle. If the
complainant's conduct is clearly proscribed by the statute, "he may
not successfully challenge it for vagueness."1 6 7 Presumably, any
§ 1346 case involving bribery or concealment of material information
would survive a vagueness challenge. Furthermore, fraud requires
specific intent, which "mitigate [s] the law's vagueness, especially with
respect to the adequacy of notice."16 8 Where established, the specific
intent element of honest services fraud undercuts a complainant's
claim that he did not know his conduct was prohibited. 169 Lastly, the
Court may simply not be inclined to invalidate a criminal statute that
is neither characterized by strict liability nor used to suppress street
crime.17 0
In sum, vagueness challenges to § 1346 are unlikely to succeed
for several key reasons. For one, the courts of appeals have yet to find
the statute facially invalid or even vague as applied-though not for
lack of opportunity. Secondly, given the breadth of pre- and postMcNally honest services case law, the statute cannot be said to be
impermissibly vague in all applications, nor can it be reasonably contended that it fails to provide minimum notice or an ascertainable
standard of enforcement. Therefore, unless the First Amendment is
implicated in the case under review, the Court will likely assess vagueness challenges as applied to the defendant's conduct. Under that
analysis, too many factors, e.g., narrowing contexts such as specific
intent, weigh against finding § 1346 unconstitutionally vague. That
conclusion has been borne out by the circuits' nearly universal rejection of § 1346 vagueness challenges.
166 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497
(1982) (stating that in order to sustain a facial vagueness challenge, "the complainant
must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications").
167 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
168 Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99.
169 See United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (indicating
that the specific intent element vitiates notice concerns because judicial explication of
the statute and caselaw afford reasonable notice).
170 Cf Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal ConstitutionalRestrictions on the Punishment of
Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of DispleasingPolice Officers, and
the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 220-22 (1967) (discussing the Court's interest in
restraining arbitrary police enforcement of street crimes).
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Section 1346 and the Federalism/FederalCommon Law Question"'7

Aside from complaints that § 1346 is incomprehensibly vague, a
frequent criticism of the honest services statute is that it contravenes
principals of federalism.1 72 Critics charge that using mail fraud to
prosecute local corruption "constitutes an impermissible federal intrusion into the political affairs" of subnational governmentsI 7 3-it
accords the federal government a status of parenspatriae for state and
local governments and their citizens. 174 McNally, which overturned all
prior intangible rights mail fraud convictions-including honest services cases17 5-voiced similar concerns, stating that it would not
"involve [ ] the Federal Government in setting standards of . .. good
government for local and state officials."' 7 6 But the Court's concern
in McNally might be better characterized as stemming from the proscription against federal common-law crimes, which was established
two centuries ago in United States v. Hudson.'7 7
Although the proscription of federal common-law crimes may be
swaddled in the blanket of federalism, the two principles are nevertheless distinct and merit separate consideration. At its core, federalism
concerns the distribution of authority between state and federal governments.1 78 Respecting federalism, Hudson held that federal courts
do not have common-law criminal jurisdiction-there are no federal
crimes unless formally enacted by Congress.1 79 But the Hudson decision has a broader implication than federalism. To illustrate an issue,
171 As with the question of vagueness, this Note does not purport to fully address
the federalism concerns evoked by § 1346. For further discussion of such concerns,
see George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-MailFraud, State Law and
Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225 (1997); Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee
Clause as a Basisfor FederalProsecutionsof State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 369
(1989); Moohr, supra note 42, at 172-87.
172 See generally Brown, supra note 171, at 231 (noting a "de facto" recognition by
the federal courts that honest services mail fraud implicates federalism concerns);
Moohr, supra note 42, at 157 (concluding that intangible rights mail fraud violates
federalism).
173 United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1357 (4th Cir. 1979).
174 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987); Mandel, 591 F.2d at
1357.
175 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
176 McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
177 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
178 See id. at 33.
179 Id. at 34. Hudson is generally read as proscribing all federal common law
crimes. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 171, at 277 n.447. But a narrower reading of
Hudson may also be plausible. The Hudson Court stated:
The only ground on which it has even been contended that [commonlaw criminal] jurisdiction could be maintained is, that, upon the formation
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consider that Congress may enact statutes to curb the corruption of
federal officials without offending federalism. Federalism is only an
issue where federal statutes intrude upon matters that are traditionally
policed at the state level. 8 0 Punishment of local political corruption
is one such matter.1 8 1 Now consider Hudson's proscription of federal
common-law crimes in the context of a federal anticorruption law. If
the statute incorporates an ambiguous criminal standard, e.g., one
relying on custom, it subjects all defendants to the same uncertainty,
regardless of whether they are state or federal public officials. Ergo, if
the statute were sufficiently definite, it would not violate Hudson, but
may still offend federalism. The reverse is also true: a statute may violate Hudson without subverting federalism.
Given the ease of satisfying federal jurisdiction,1 82 if § 1346 were
drafted using more precise, definite language-without micromanaging state affairs-then federalism-based criticisms of honest services
fraud might be quieted to a large extent. As far back as Badders, the
Court upheld the notion that Congress may tangentially reach conduct that it cannot otherwise regulate directly.18 3 Moreover, as Representative Conyers noted before Congress enacted § 1346,184 the
of any political body, an implied power to preserve its own existence and
promote the end and object of its creation, necessarily results to it....

Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice
from the nature of their institution. . . . [S]o far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute, but all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases we are of opinion is not within their
implied powers.
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33-34 (emphasis added). If "all" is read to mean "any,"
then Hudson stands for the proposition that there are no federal common-law crimes.
If, however, "all" means "every," then arguably there may exist some common law
crimes over which federal courts have jurisdiction. Cf United States v. Coolidge, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat) 415 (1816) (discussing ambiguity of the ruling in Hudson, and withholding consideration of the matter until argument could be held).
180 See Moohr, supra note 42, at 172-75.
181 Id.
182 See generally G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised
ConstitutionalTheory or New CongressionalStatutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive
Discretion, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 1175, 1176, 1219-46 (1995) (suggesting that jurisdictional
barriers to federalizing criminal law have been eroding since Champion v. Ames, 188

U.S. 321 (1903)). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (invalidating a federal gun-control statute on basis of federalism and doubting whether
"there will never be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local").
183 See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916).
184 See 134 CONG. REc. 33,297 (1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("I believe that
the guarantee clause of the U.S. Constitution, article IV, section 4 can be used as a
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Guarantee Clause provides a constitutional basis for federal criminalization of political corruption. Accepting as much, it follows that the
primary motivation for judicially created limiting constructions of
honest services fraud 8 5 must proceed as much (possibly more) from
Hudson as from sheer federalism.1 8 6 That conclusion is not meant to
suggest that federalism is an invalid or petty criticism of honest services fraud, but rather that, presupposing a legitimate and compelling
federal interest in curbing subnational political corruption, the proverbial elephant in the room is really Hudson.18 7 If state and local
political corruption does not suffice as a uniquely federal interestsuch that would allow creation of a federal common law standard for
"honest services" 8 8-then the circuits are justified in adopting limits
that conform § 1346 to Hudson.
C.

The Circuit Split: Section 1346's Treatment in the Courts of Appeals

Despite criticism that § 1346 is vague and offends federalism, the
courts of appeals have retained the statute rather than declare it invaconstitutional basis for Congress to pass criminal legislation relating to corruption in
local government.").
185 See infra Part II.C.
186 The Seventh Circuit couched its decision to impose a private gain requirement
on § 1346 in such terms. See United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir.
1998) (discussing the need for a "limiting principle" on judicial constructions of
§ 1346, so as to avoid the creation of a "federal common-law crime," and citing Hudson and other cases).
187 See supra note 179. Indeed, there are instances where the Court has found it
acceptable to adopt a federal common law. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) ("[T]he Court has recognized the need and authority in
some limited areas to formulate what has come to be known as 'federal common
law.' "). In Texas Industries, the Court explained:
[A]bsent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of
decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States .

. .

. In these

instances, ourfederal system does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state
law, either because the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign
are intimately involved or because the interstate or international nature of
the controversy makes it inappropriate for state law to control.
Id. at 641 (emphasis added). Perhaps subnational political corruption, in view of the
Guarantee Clause, implicates "uniquely federal interests of the kind that oblige courts
to formulate federal common law." Id. at 642. The federal government is charged
with guaranteeing to the states a republican form of government, but subnational
corruption is as much a state (or local) concern as it is federal, i.e., it is not "uniquely
federal."
188 See supra note 186.
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lid. 189 To do so, however, circuits have adopted limiting constructions
for the phrase "honest services," which cure vagueness and federalism
issues, and generally restrain prosecutors from overusing the statute.
For example, the Fifth Circuit defines honest services according to
state law, i.e., a public official's fiduciary duty to the citizenry is that
specified by state law. 19 0 The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, does not
require a state law violation, but, unlike the Fifth Circuit, it does
require intent to accrue private gain as a result of the fraudulent
scheme.19 1 Other circuits rely on the specific intent element of mail
fraud to discourage arbitrary prosecution under § 1346, yet hold that
"honest services" are governed by a uniform federal standard that is
not qualified by state law or private gain.1 92
1. State Law Limiting Principle- United States v. Brumley'9 3
The Fifth Circuit (and possibly the Third Circuit 9 4 ) has expressly
adopted a state law limiting principle to cabin the reach of honest
189 See supra notes 132, 137 and accompanying text.
190 See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 735 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
191 See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 707-08 (7th Cir. 2008).
192 See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1248 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that honest services is a uniform federal standard that governs every public official);
United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that § 1346
does not require a state law violation); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1106
(10th Cir. 2003) (stating that § 1346 does not require personal gain); United States v.
Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 725-26 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that state law violation is not
determinative of honest services fraud and private gain is not required).
193 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
194 See United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 116 (3d Cir. 2003). The Third
Circuit stated, "We thus endorse . . . the decisions of other Courts of Appeals that
have interpreted § 1346 more stringently and required a state law limiting principle
for honest services fraud . . . ." Id. One year prior, in United States v. Panarella,277

F.3d 678 (3d Cir. 2002), the Third Circuit rejected a private gain interpretation of
honest services fraud, reasoning that a standard based solely on the "misuse of office
for personal gain" would be "too broad" and "too vague to cure whatever ambiguity
exists in the meaning of honest services fraud." Id. at 692. But Panarellaheld that a
public official engages in honest services fraud when he "conceals a financial interest
in violation of a [state or local] criminal disclosure statute and takes discretionary
action in his official capacity that he knows will directly benefit that interest."
Panarella,277 F.3d at 698. That court did not, therefore, decide that violation of a
criminal disclosure law is necessary for honest services fraud-it merely held that such
a violation, coupled with other facts, e.g., private gain, is sufficient to sustain a charge
under § 1346. Id. at 699 n.9. I am thus reluctant to assert that the Third Circuit has
affirmatively adopted a state law limiting principle for § 1346. Insofar as Panarella
may be read as adopting a state law limiting principle, it would also have to be read as
requiring intent to accrue private gain-which that court expressly rejected. Id. at
692. As a further matter, the court in Murphy no more adopted a state law limiting

1716

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 85:4

services fraud.19 5 In Brumley, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted a ramification of § 1346 on federalism: that its unbounded
definition of "honest services" could transform a state official's "ethical lapses"1 96-that do not violate state law-into a federal crime. 9 7
The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to "establish an ethical regime for state employees" when it enacted § 1346, that federalism precluded such a construction.19 8 As such, the Fifth Circuit
resolved the issue by holding that "services" owed under § 1346 are
limited to those provided by state law.' 99 The court explained:
Stated directly, the official must act or fail to act contrary to the
requirements of his job under state law. This means that if the official does all that is required under state law, alleging that the services were not otherwise done "honestly" does not charge a violation
of the mail fraud statute. The statute contemplates that there must
first be a breach of a state-owed duty. 200
But violating a state law does not, of itself, bring a politician's
conduct within reach of mail fraud-"honest services" contemplates
purposeful departure from one's official duties, i.e., specific intent to
defraud.2 0 ' The state law limiting principle is not a proxy for substantive elements of mail fraud; state of mind is required. 202 Note, however, that Brumley did not address whether an official's duties must be
owed under state criminal law-whether violation of a civil law suffices
is an open question. 20 3

principle than did the court in Panarella-infact, Murphy specifically disclaims doing
so. See Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117. I concede, however, that at least one appellate court
and commentator have concluded that the reasoning of Panarella and Murphy
amount to Third Circuit adoption of the Fifth Circuit standard. See Sorich, 523 F.3d at
712; Avery, supra note 39, at 1442-44.
195 See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 735.
196 Id. at 730-31.
197 Id. at 734.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 735. Brumley overruled prior cases wherein state law was not violated. Id.
200 Id. at 734.
201 Id. (explaining that the defendant must have "consciously contemplated or
intended such actions").
202 See id.

203 Id.
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United States v. Bloom2 04

The Seventh Circuit has expressly adopted a private gain limiting
principle to cabin honest services fraud.2 05 Similar to the Fifth Circuit
in Brumley, the Seventh Circuit in Bloom was concerned that, absent a
limiting construction, § 1346 would amount to a federal common-law
crime. 206 Whereas Brumley focused on the meaning of "services" to
limit § 1346,207 the Seventh Circuit chose to qualify the meaning of
"honest."20 8 Noting that breach of fiduciary duty, without more, is not
criminal fraud, the court sought a way of distinguishing between
minor violations and those that rise to the level of honest services
fraud. 209 The Seventh Circuit held that "[m]isuse of office (more
broadly, misuse of position) for private gain is the line that separates
run of the mill violations of state-law fiduciary duty. .. from federal
crime."2 1 0
Indeed, Bloom's holding seems to accept, as its premise, an
existing violation of fiduciary duty owed under state law (d la Brumley);
nevertheless, the case has not been read as requiring a state law violation for § 1346.211 In United States v. Thompson,2 12 however, the Seventh Circuit signaled that it might eventually adopt a state law limiting
principle. The court admitted that "misuse of office" is almost as "slippery" as "honest services," and stated it "may need to gloss the phrase
to reduce the risk . . . to public servants."2 13
204 149 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998).
205 See id. at 656-57; United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.
2007).
206 See Bloom, 149 F.3d at 654.
207 See supra Part II.C.1.
208 See generally Bloom, 149 F.3d at 654-55 (explaining that the dispositive element
of misuse is private gain).
209 Id. Bloom gave short shrift to the state law limiting principle-dismissing it as
potentially bringing all breaches of an official's fiduciary duty within the honest services statute. See id. Such analysis neglects the specific intent element, which Brumley
explained must be present for a state law violation to constitute federal criminal
fraud. See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734.
210 Bloom, 149 F.3d at 655 (emphasis added). Subsequent cases further explicated
the private gain requirement set out in Bloom. See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d
702, 709 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that private gain may be personal or go to a third
party); Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884 (finding that earned pay raises and peace of mind
are not "private benefits" for honest services fraud).
211 See, e.g., Sorich, 523 F.3d at 707-08 (quoting Bloom, but foregoing any discussion of its reference to "violations of state-law fiduciary duty").
212 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007).
213 Id. at 883. To disambiguate the phrase "misuse of office," the court will inevitably have to establish what constitutes the proper use of office. Brumley looked to state
law. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. But see Sorich, 523 F.3d at 712 ("[W]e
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Treatment in Other Circuits

The majority of circuits have eschewed adopting a state law limiting principle for honest services fraud, and none have placed as much
emphasis on private gain as the Seventh Circuit. 214 In Weyhrauch, for
example, the Ninth Circuit maintained that § 1346 reflects a federal
interest in establishing a standard of conduct for public officials that
does not depend on geography.2 15 The First Circuit has also read
"honest services" as independent of state law, 216 preferring instead to
emphasize the specific intent element of fraud. 2 17 In United States v.
Sawyer,2 1s however, the First Circuit noted that, when the requisite
intent to deceive is built into a state law, a violation of that law may
suffice for § 1346.219 Other circuits have similarly foregone imposing
substantive limits on honest services fraud. 220

III.

THE CASE FOR CHANGE IN HONEST SERVICES
FRAUD PROSECUTIONS

This Part lays out a set of substantive legal limitations, and evidentiary and procedural safeguards, which are recommended as the floor
level of a restraining framework that should be adopted for § 1346
prosecutions of politicians.2 2 1 Specifically, this Part recommends that
have never held that only state law can supply a fiduciary duty between public official
and public. . . .").
214 See supra note 192.
215 See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008). The
court stated:
In short, Congress has a legitimate interest in ensuring that state action
affecting federal priorities is not improperly influenced by personal motivations of state policymakers and regulators, and the happenstance of whether
state law prohibits particular conduct should not control Congress' ability to
protect federal interests through the federal fraud statutes ....
Id.
216 See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 728-29 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that
mere violation of a state law, even a law concerning the appearance of corruption,
does not necessarily deprive the public of its right to honest services).
217 Id. at 730 (requiring the government to prove specific intent); see also United
States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 298-99 (1st Cir. 2008) (same); United States v.
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (1st Cir. 1997) (same).
218 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
219 See id. at 729.
220 See, e.g., United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996) (fraudulent
intent is essential); see also supra note 192 (listing circuits that focus on specific intent
to defraud).
221 Potential abuse of § 1346 by "headline-grabbing prosecutors," Sorich v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari),
could be checked if the Court regarded use of the mail as more than a mere jurisdic-
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the Court interpret § 1346 to require violation of at least a state criminal law and proof of intent to obtain a private gain that is not de
minimis. Furthermore, given that many American jurors are apt to
regard politician-defendants as presumptively guilty, this Part recommends that the Court require corroboration of accomplice witness testimony in all honest services fraud prosecutions involving politicians.
Where such cases implicate protected speech, the Court is urged to
treat sufficiency of evidence in the trial record, upon which the jury
may find a defendant's specific intent to defraud, as a question of law
that is reviewed de novo.
A.

PracticalConsequences of Failing to Adopt Limiting Principles

The modern American political system is an inherently fertile
ground for impropriety.2 2 2 Political life comes with unique power,
e.g., influence, which the public entrusts to politicians to use in good
faith on its behalf. Party patronage is often accompanied by political
favors of varying degrees, some of which amount to trifles whereas
others flatly undermine the notions of honesty and fair play central to
tional element of the substantive offense. Cf Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705,
723 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("[I]t is mailfraud, not mail and fraud, that incurs
liability." (emphasis added)). Mail fraud prosecutions could be cabined by mandating that use of the mail must be in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. See id. at
722-23 (stating that mail fraud occurs when the mailing is for the purpose of executing, and in furtherance of, a fraud). Unfortunately, Schmuck seems to shut the door
on that limitation. Schmuck reiterated that "use of the mails need not be an essential
element of the scheme," id. at 710 (majority opinion), and, considering the tenuous
link between Schmuck's scheme and the incidental mailings, apparently relegated use
of the mail to a formality. See id. at 711-15. Ironically, Schmuck aggravates the very
problem complained of by critics of § 1346-that it allows specious prosecution
under § 1341. Justices Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor recognized as much,
albeit in a conventional fraud case. See id. at 722-25 (Scalia,J., dissenting). That said,
requiring a mailing in furtheranceof the scheme arguably has no bearing on a politician's misuse of office for private gain. That corrupt politicians should be prosecuted
has nothing to do with mail or bandwidth-the federal authority to criminalize such
conduct is in the Guarantee Clause. Moreover, the near-universal reliance on electronic communication in the United States relegates use of wires to a jurisdictional
formality anyway. That bandwidth technology will be used in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme is, today, entirely predictable. As such, I admit that short of reading a
purpose requirement into "scheme or artifice," i.e., purpose to use the mails (or
wires) to defraud renewed emphasis on the mailing element would be of little import.
In any event, the Court settled the issue long ago in United States v. Young, 232 U.S.
155 (1914), holding that the elements of mail fraud are "that the scheme should be
devised ... and a letter be placed in the post office for the purpose of executing the
scheme." Id. at 161.
222 See generally Moohr, supra note 42, at 153-54 (discussing political corruption).
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our form of government.223 When the power of public office is misused to further a politician's self-interest, the public is wronged-its
faith in the integrity of government is eroded.2 2 4 Such corruption
may involve local law enforcement and prosecutive agencies, or preclude them from redressing corruption for fear of reprisal. 225 As
such, a federal crime aimed at uprooting subnational political corruption is warranted and ought to be retained as an instrument ofjustice.
The open-ended, largely ad hoc interpretation of § 1346 in the majority of circuits, however, warrants a uniform measure of restraint.
Arguing from federalism tends to be an academic pursuit, but the
practical consequences of allowing § 1346 to go unrestrained in federal circuits are alarming. In most circuits a state politician whose
conduct, albeit unethical, complies with that state's laws can be subjected to federal prosecution. 226 Consider Weyhrauch.22 7 His failure
to disclose a conflict-of-interest may have been intentional, but it was
not a criminal offense in Alaska. 228 Although he might have known
that his conduct was disfavored, he had no express reason to think it
would subject him to federal prosecution. And therein lies the problem: uncertainty.
A politician may have a lawyer's knowledge of the laws in his state
and the honest services case law of that circuit, but that may not be
enough-the indefiniteness of a federal common law standard may
cause him to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.'"229 Moreover,
unscrupulous prosecutors supplant any well-meaning purposes of
such a standard.2 30 Most of all, the prospect of federal criminal prosecution for conduct that may only be civilly fineable at the state level
makes public service a risky proposition. Granted, politicians who
intentionally violate state law (even civil law) for private gain should
be punished. But for the late middle-aged politician who complies
with state law, or even breaches the law in good faith, § 1346 presents
an austere hazard. If convicted, he loses his good name, his privilege
to practice law (if an attorney),231 and his ability to earn an income
223 See id.
224 See id. at 185.
225 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
226 See supra Part II.C.
227 See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008).
228 Id. at 1240.
229 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
230 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
231 Siegelman and Weyhrauch are lawyers.
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while incarcerated 2 3 2-he leaves prison as a disreputable, aging
paralegal. Rather than a slap on the wrist, he gets a kick in the groin.
B.

On Substantive Legal Limitations

Criticisms that § 1346 is impermissibly vague, offends federalism,
and affords federal prosecutors unchecked discretion to target state
and local politicians, could be cured by adopting a circuit-wide statelaw limiting principle 23 3 along with a material private gain requirement.2 3 4 Absent a further amendment explicating the meaning of
"honest services," state criminal (and possibly civil) laws should define
the "outer boundaries" of a politician's fiduciary duty owed to the
public. State laws governing the actions taken in a politician's official
capacity, e.g., laws promoting unbiased and transparent government,
should define the "outer boundaries"2 3 5 of "honest services." Furthermore, to militate against prosecutive theories for § 1346 that are based
on inferring a "scheme or artifice to defraud" from a breach of duty
(owed under state law) that results in a de minimis private gain, the
Court should also impose a material private gain limiting principle, as
adopted by the Seventh Circuit.
C.

On Evidentiary and ProceduralSafeguards

In order to prove mail fraud, a prosecutor must show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant formed specific intent to
defraud, 23 6 i.e., he must prove state of mind. There are essentially
four ways to do that: by evidence obtained using electronic surveillance, by testimony of an undercover agent, by testimony of an
informant, or by circumstantial evidence. When the prosecutive theory involves conventional fraud, the defendant's conduct may suffice
to establish his intent-by virtue of false statements or misrepresentations, he obtains money or property without exchanging something of
equal value.23 7 In tangible fraud cases, proving conduct is almost on
par with proving state of mind. The same cannot be said of honest
services cases, however, because the mere fact of the defendant's conduct is often inconclusive as to his state of mind. In those cases,
breach of a politician's duty to the public does not indicate, ipso facto,
232
233
234
235
236
237

Mail fraud carries up to a twenty-year sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997).
See United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998).
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing elements of mail fraud).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
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that he devised a scheme to defraud.2 3 8 His conduct may deprive
"honest services," even purposely, without being part of a broader
scheme to defraud.2 39 "Post hoc ergo propter hoc is the name of a logical
error, not a reason to infer causation."24 0
As a practical matter in honest services cases, prosecutors must
point to evidence more probative of state of mind than circumstantial
happenstances. Without a wiretap or a recording, or an undercover
agent, the only option available to a prosecutor is an accomplice's testimony. 241 For example, in an honest services case where the defendant has allegedly accepted payment in exchange for a political
favor,2 4 2 accomplice testimony might be the only evidence of a quid
pro quo 24 3 agreement between the parties. 24 4 Alas, unless the accomplice has an irresistible urge to confess his involvement, the likelihood
is that his testimony will be given in exchange for immunity or
favorable treatment. 245 The government will, in essence, buy accomplice testimony.
Faced with the possibility of being prosecuted himself, a cooperating accomplice has motive to embellish his testimony against the
238 See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734; see also supra notes 198-200 and accompanying
text (stating that the breach of fiduciary duty is not a proxy for state of mind).
239 See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734; supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
Where a politician's breach of fiduciary duty accompanies a substantial private gain,
the circumstantial evidence is probative of fraud, similar to that in a conventional
fraud case. Honest services fraud should require an intent to obtain a material private gain. See supra Part II.B.
240 United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 879 (7th Cir. 2007). Correlation
and causation are not synonymous. Post hoc ergo propterhoc, and its companion cum hoc
ergo propter hoc, are valid proofs neither of a scientific hypothesis nor of a prosecutive
theory.
241 See, e.g., United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 106 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Jain,
93 F.3d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1996).
242 See, e.g., United States v. Inzunza, 580 F.3d 894, 897-98 & 901 (9th Cir. 2009)
(alleging that Inzunza took bribes in exchange for official action favoring bribepayer); Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1219 (alleging Siegelman took bribes to appoint bribepayer to state board); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1356-57 & 1359 (4th
Cir. 1979) (alleging Mandel took bribes to endorse legislation favorable to bribepayer).
243 See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1991) (holding that
color of law extortion under the Hobbs Act requires a quid pro quo agreement to be
influenced).
244 See, e.g., Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1227 (relying on accomplice testimony to prove
bribery).
245 Hence the term, "unindicted co-conspirator." See United States v. Sawyer, 85
F.3d 713, 722 (1st Cir. 1996). Evidently, Sawyer's accomplice, Hathaway, received
immunity.
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defendant in hope of gaining favorable treatment for himself. Many
states are cognizant of the risk posed by such bought testimony and
therefore do not permit convictions to stand on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. 246 Federal courts, however, do not
require that such testimony be corroborated.2 4 7 When added to the
fact that many Americans believe politicians are corrupt before they
enter a courtroom, prosecutions that rely on an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony are inherently prejudicial.
Instead of being "presumed innocent," politician-defendants are
subject to the skepticism of American jurors. 2 48 If an accomplice witness's bravado is the only evidence from which a jury can infer the
defendant's state of mind, e.g., quid pro quo agreement, then he has
been dealt an unfair hand, indeed. Paradoxically, federal courts do
not allow a conviction to rest on the defendant's uncorroborated confession. 24 9 Confessions are treated as inherently unreliable, 250 yet fed246 See, e.g., Swinford v. State, 154 S.W.3d 262, 266-67 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004)
(requiring corroboration of accomplice witness testimony); People v. Carrington, 211
P.3d 617, 654 (Cal. 2009) (same); Savage v. State, 679 S.E.2d 734, 738 (Ga. Ct. App.
2009) (same); State v. Stone, 216 P.3d 648, 649 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) ("'This statutory corroboration requirement is intended to protect against the danger that an
accomplice may wholly fabricate testimony, incriminating an innocent defendant in
order to win more favorable treatment for the accomplice.'" (quoting Matthews v.

State, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001))); State v. Douglas, 675 N.W.2d 567,
568 (Iowa 2004) (requiring corroboration of accomplice witness testimony); In re
Anthony W., 879 A.2d 717, 724 (Md. 2005) (same); State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854,
877 (Minn. 2008) ("A criminal defendant may not be convicted based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice ... [because] the credibility of an accomplice
is inherently untrustworthy."); State v. Wendler, 197 P.3d 932, 935 (Mont. 2008)
(requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony); In reJ.K, 763 N.W.2d 507, 512
(N.D. 2009) (same); People v. Delgado, 855 N.Y.S.2d 253, 256 (App. Div. 2008)
(same); State v. Robinson, 239 S.W.3d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006) (same).
247 See United States v. Fuller, 557 F.3d 859, 863 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Accomplice
testimony .. . need not be corroborated to support a conviction."); United States v.
Parada, 577 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 2009) (uncorroborated testimony of a cocon-

spirator is sufficient evidence on which to base a conviction); United States v. Arledge,
553 F.3d 881, 888 (5th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Riggi, 541 F.3d 94, 110 (2d
Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006)
(same); United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2004) (same);
United States v. Ofcky, 237 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2001) (same).
248 See supra note 16.
249 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1963).
It is a settled principle of the administration of criminal justice in the
federal courts that a conviction must rest upon firmer ground than the
uncorroborated admission or confession of the accused.... [T] he requirement of corroboration is rooted . . . "in the realization that sound law

enforcement requires police investigations which extend beyond the words
of the accused."

1724

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

85-4

eral courts permit convictions based on an accomplice's bought
testimony 251-a confession by proxy. Why is an accomplice afforded
more credibility in federal court than the defendant's own confession? It would seem that the same ideals of "sound law enforcement"25 2 that require proof beyond the "words of the accused" 2 53
should reject a rule that allows a self-interested witness to confess on a
defendant's behalf.
The Court should require extrinsic evidence to corroborate
accomplice witness testimony in honest services cases. Given the negative disposition towards politician-defendants and credibility issues
inherent in accomplice testimony, a corroboration requirement is a
prudent evidentiary safeguard for § 1346 cases. Another approach
would require the government to negate, i.e., disprove, exculpating
theories of the defendant's conduct. Such safeguards would countenance the prejudicial circumstances that accompany political corruption cases, and may restrain prosecutor discretion as effectively as
substantive limits.
Because the same prejudicial circumstances are at work in political corruption cases that implicate First Amendment concerns, procedural safeguards are also warranted. Prosecutive theories of §§ 1341
and 1346 that involve protected speech, e.g., campaign contributions, 25 4 risk chilling political activities, like party patronage. 25 5 If a
campaign supporter believes any subsequent official action that benefits him ideologically or personally might be construed as impropriety
and subject him to federal prosecution, he may terminate his
patronage entirely.2 5 6
Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954)).
250 See id.
251 See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
252 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 489.
253 Id.
254 See, e.g., United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009). The
§ 1346 charge in Siegelman was based on Siegelman receiving a campaign contribution and the donee later being appointed to a state review board. Id. at 1219. By
themselves, those separate facts are not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Siegelman had a quid pro quo agreement with his benefactor-conclusions to the contrary
are false byproducts of post hoc ergo propterhoc. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text. Siegelman's alleged accomplice, Bailey, who testified for the government,
provided the only direct evidence that the payment was a bribe. See Siegelman, 561
F.3d at 1220-23. Bailey essentially confessed on behalf of Siegelman.
255 See Moohr, supra note 42, at 180-83 (selective prosecution under § 1341 (and
§ 1346) may chill First Amendment protected political activities).
256 See id.
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As the Court recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 57
"[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion ...
is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." 25 8 The Court
regards political speech so highly that in New York Times it held that
libel can only be established where a defamatory statement is made
with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."259 The line between
libel and protected speech may, perhaps, then be characterized as the
professionalism, quality, or due diligence of the statement. Malice is
such a crucial element that the Court also established a constitutionally based rule requiring appellate courts to make an independent
examination, i.e., de novo review, of the trial record to ensure free
expression is not intruded upon.260 Subsequent decisions firmly hold
that "actual malice" is a question of law. 26 1
Practically speaking, a politician has not violated state law, let
alone § 1346, until the government proves its case. Party patronage,
for example, does not breach the line of legality until the prosecution
proves bribery. Hence, substantive limits on honest services fraud may
not be enough to curb the risk that protected speech will be trammeled by specious prosecutions. Honest services cases involving protected speech should be treated similarly to the Court's approach in
New York Times and the subsequent line of libel decisions.2 62 Campaign contributions are protected political speech.2 63 When an indictment under § 1346 is based on the theory that campaign
contributions prompted official action that deprived the public of its
right to honest services, the line between fraud and protected speech
becomes the professionalism, quality, or due diligence of the government's case-in-chief.
Ergo, the sufficiency of evidence from which ajury may find the
defendant's specific intent to defraud should be a question of law, the
way "malice" is a question of law in libel cases. Moreover, that question of law should be reviewed de novo to ensure that any prejudicial
biases of the jury-possibly the trial judge-against politicians "do not
257 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
258 Id. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
259 Id. at 279-80.
260 Id. at 285; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (independent examination applies to federal and state trial
court decisions).
261 See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685
(1989).
262 See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
263 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49-58 (1976).
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constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."26 4
Such procedural safeguards constitute yet another manner of
restraining federal prosecutors' discretion to abuse § 1346 for base
personal or political motives, which are not tantamount to invalidating the theory of honest services mail fraud.
CONCLUSION

Maybe the reason why many Americans believe that politicians
are corrupt is because, too often, their belief is confirmed. For that
reason alone, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 ought be preserved as an instrument of
justice. Indeed, if the United States is to endure as a republic rather
than a pseudomonarchy where politicians are notorious for cashing in
on their offices, for hocking governmental authority to feather their
nests, then federal and subnational public corruption must be
deterred. But a corollary of public corruption-that vengeful prosecution may itself deprive citizens of their right of honest servicesobliges the Court to adopt unifying limitations on the statute. At the
minimum, honest services prosecutions of state and local politicians
should require the violation of a state criminal law respecting fiduciary duties owed to the public or transparency in government, e.g.,
bribery or disclosure standards. To further qualify prosecutor discretion, the Court should also adopt a material private gain requirement.
Complementary limits should also apply to honest services fraud cases
involving federal politicians. Moreover, given the widely held belief
that politicians are corrupt, evidentiary safeguards should be adopted
to raise the bar of proof, thereby deterring bad-faith prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
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N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 285.

